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Since the late 1980s, minimum wages have become an important plank of the Indonesian 
government’s labour policy. Minimum wages have increased faster than average wages 
and GDP. As a result, minimum wages have become binding for the majority of workers. 
This study finds that minimum wages have a positive but statistically insignificant impact 
on average wages. On the other hand, minimum wages have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on employment. In particular, the disemployment impact is greatest for 
women, youth, and less educated workers. However, the employment prospects of white-
collar workers are enhanced by increases in minimum wages. 
 
JEL Classification:  J23, J31, J38 
Key words:  Minimum wage, wages, employment, developing countries, Indonesia I.  Introduction 
Although minimum wages were first introduced in Indonesia in the early 1970s, 
their importance did not gain much attention until the late 1980s when the government 
began to make minimum wages an important plank of its labour market policies. In the 
first half of 1990s, the government tripled minimum wages in nominal terms and more 
than doubled in real terms in a period of just five years. During the second half of the 
1990s, nominal minimum wages continued to increase, but in real terms began to taper 
off after 1996 and fell significantly in 1998 due to the high inflation that swept the 
country during the economic crisis.
1  
However, the importance of minimum wages as a key element of economic and 
social policy has reappeared in 2000 and 2001. In these two consecutive years, the levels 
of minimum wages were increased very significantly. As a result, the levels of real 
minimum wages in 2001 are estimated to be already higher than their peak pre-crisis 
levels in 1997. Critically, this was all done in the backdrop of an economy which was still 
struggle to recover after a major economic crisis. After a massive economic contraction 
of 13.7 percent in 1998 and near zero economic growth in 1999, the economy grew by 
around 5 percent in 2000 and various estimates put the economic growth in 2001 to a 
lower level, ranges between 3 to 3.5 percent.  
Both theoretically and empirically, there is no consensus on the direction and 
magnitude of the likely impact of minimum wages on employment. At the theoretical 
                                                 
1 Indonesia was hit by an economic crisis starting in the mid of 1997. The impact of the crisis still evolves 
in 2001, four years after the crisis started. See Feridhanusetyawan (1999) and Manning (2000) for 
discussions on the impact of the crisis on the labour market.  level, a competitive labour market model predicts that a minimum wage established 
above the equilibrium market wage will cause a reduction in employment and create 
unemployment. On the other hand, a monopsonistic labour market model predicts that a 
minimum wage set above the monopsony wage level (but below the competitive wage 
level) will increase employment.  
Whether a country’s labour market is closer to the competitive or monopsonistic 
model is an empirical matter. However, observers generally have maintained that the 
Indonesian labour market  particularly real wages  is flexible.
2 There is no evidence 
to characterise the Indonesian labour market as monopsonistic, with the minor possible 
exception of some large, isolated employers in the outer islands.
3  
In the context of developed countries, the recent controversy on the impact of 
minimum wages on employment has focused around the findings of Card and Krueger 
(1994). Based on data collected through a telephone survey of fast-food restaurants, they 
compare employment changes in two states in the United States. They find that 
restaurants in New Jersey, where the minimum wage was increased, expanded their 
workforce relative to restaurants in Pennsylvania, where there was no change in the 
minimum wage.  
This finding has been challenged by many, notably by Neumark and Wascher 
(1995). They re-evaluate the evidence from Card and Krueger finding using different 
data, obtained from actual payroll records. They find that the minimum wage increase in 
                                                 
2 See Feridhanusetyawan (1999) and Manning (2000).  
3 For the most recent comprehensive review of the Indonesian labour market, see Manning (1998).  
  2 New Jersey actually led to a decrease in employment in this state relative to the 
Pennsylvania control group. 
  A similar controversy has occurred in the context of developing countries. 
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) analyse the imposition of U.S. minimum wage 
norms in Puerto Rico. They estimate that elasticity of employment to minimum wage in 
this country is around –0.5. Hence, they assert that the imposition of U.S. minimum wage 
has led to massive job loss on the island. Krueger (1995), however, disputes this finding 
on methodological grounds and argues that the evidence of a negative employment 
impact of the imposition of U.S. minimum wage in Puerto Rico is statistically fragile.  
Meanwhile, Bell (1997) contrasts the cases of Mexico, where minimum wages are 
very low relative to average wages, and Columbia, where minimum wages are much 
closer to the mean. She finds that the disemployment impact of minimum wages is zero 
in Mexico but substantial in Columbia. Similarly, based on a study of eight Latin 
American countries, Maloney and Nuñez (2001) find minimum wages have significant 
implication for employment and affect wage distribution, not only in the neighbourhood 
of the minimum wages but also in the higher reaches of the distribution and in the 
informal sector. 
In the context of Indonesia, the first serious attempt to assess the impact of 
minimum wage policy on the labour market was conducted by Rama (1996).
4 He finds 
that minimum wages have a modest impact on labour market outcomes. Based on the 
results of his analysis, he concludes that the doubling of the minimum wage in the first 
half of 1990s has led to an increase in average wages in the range of 5 to 15 percent, and 
                                                 
4 Subsequently published as Rama (2001).  
  3 a decrease in urban wage employment in the range of 0 to 5 percent. However, he 
suggests that the disemployment impact appeared to be considerable in small 
manufacturing firms. 
This finding has been challenged by Islam and Nazara (2000). They argue that the 
Indonesian regional minimum wage policy has not impaired employment prospect. They 
also argue that there is no evidence that minimum wage-induced increases in domestic 
labour costs have eroded business profitability in large and medium-scale manufacturing. 
Based on the results of their analysis, they propose that if Indonesia achieves annual 
economic growth of four percent, real minimum wages can be increased by 24 percent 
annually without incurring net job losses. 
This current study offers a reassessment of the impact of minimum wage policy 
on labour market outcomes in Indonesia, in particular in the urban formal sector. In this 
study, the wage and employment impacts of minimum wages are investigated through an 
econometric approach using the data from the National Labour Force Surveys (Sakernas). 
Different from previous studies on labour market impact of minimum wages in Indonesia 
which have only focused on the impact for the whole aggregate of workers, this study 
also assesses the impact for different types of workers.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two highlights the 
Indonesian regional minimum wage policy. Section three describes the sources of the 
data used in this study. Section four discusses the trends in the Indonesian minimum 
wages. Section five analyses the changes in wage distribution due to the imposition of 
minimum wages. Section six investigates the impact of the minimum wage policy on 
  4 average wage and employment level. Section seven provides the conclusions and 
implications of the results of this study.  
 
II.  The Indonesian Minimum Wage Policy 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Indonesian government practically did not 
intervene in wage determination, nor did it enforce regulations on the laying-off of 
workers. In addition, the government tightly controlled the labour movement by allowing 
only one government-sanctioned labour union. As a result, as noted by Manning (1994), 
there was little effective direct government or union involvement in the setting of wages.  
The late 1980s, however, witnessed many changes in the Indonesian labour 
market, two of which are especially important. Firstly, several independent labour unions 
were established despite the government’s efforts to disband them and declare them 
illegal. Secondly, the government began to enforce the implementation of the regional 
minimum wage regulations, which were updated annually.  
These changes came about in response to both internal and external pressures. 
The internal pressures came from many of those concerned about the condition of the 
workers in an increasingly industrialised Indonesian economy. This included the growing 
concern of many senior policy makers that labour was not sharing in the high growth that 
had taken place in the economy (Agrawal, 1996; Edwards, 1996; Manning, 1994). 
The external pressures, meanwhile, were an indirect result of the increasing level 
of Indonesian exports to North America and the European Union (EU), where concerns 
were being exposed in many quarters about labour market conditions in developing 
countries. The focus was on workers in export sectors, where, it was claimed, there were 
  5 poor working conditions, low wages, and the denial of fundamental rights to form labour 
union. This belief led to calls for a ‘social clause’ in the countries trade agreement 
between developed and developing countries, stipulating that favoured access to the 
markets of developed countries would not be granted to those third world countries where 
labour standards remained unsatisfactory (Addison and Demery, 1988).  
Indonesia was one of the countries targeted by this concern. In the early 1990s, 
several complaints were filed under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), 
threatening to deprive Indonesia of low tariffs on its exports to the United States market. 
On top of this, the withdrawal of investment guarantees to US companies that would 
ensue was a threat of potentially greater significance (Rama, 1996).  
As part of the responses to this, the government of Indonesia revamped the 
mechanism to set minimum wages in 1989 and then on several subsequent occasions 
during the 1990s. The government’s objective has been to set minimum wages with 
reference to a range of factors including the so called minimum subsistence needs 
(kebutuhan hidup minimum or KHM), the cost of living, the capacity and sustainability of 
companies, existing market wage rates, labour market conditions, and economic and 
income per capita growth.
5  
Prior to 1996, minimum wages were calculated with reference to what was termed 
minimum physical needs (kebutuhan fisik minimum or KFM) rather than KHM.
6 Both 
KFM and KHM are bundles of consumption items which are deemed essential for the 
livelihood of a single worker. The KHM bundle is consisted of 43 items, range from 
                                                 
5 See the Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 01/1999 on Minimum Wages. 
6 The change from KFM to KHM is stipulated in the Minister of Manpower Decree No. 81/1995. 
  6 food, clothing, housing, transport, health, to recreation.
7 Essentially KHM is a broader 
consumption bundle, and hence represents a higher standard of living, than KFM. For 
example, the food bundle of KFM was set achieve a caloric intake of 2,600 calories per 
day, while the food bundle of KHM was set achieve a caloric intake of 3,000 calories per 
day.
8  
Until 2000, most provinces had just one level of minimum wage, which was 
applied throughout the entire province. Exceptions were to be found in Riau, South 
Sumatra, West Java, East Java, and Bali, where several minimum wages existed for 
different regions within these provinces. In addition, some provinces had different 
minimum wages for different sectors of the economy. In such cases, the sectoral 
minimum wages could not be set at a lower level than the general minimum wage that 
applied in that region. 
Until the year 2000, the regional minimum wages were established by a decree 
issued by the Minister of Manpower. In determining minimum wage levels, the minister 
received recommendations from provincial governors. In formulating the 
recommendations, the governors in turn received recommendations from provincial tri-
partite councils, made up of representatives from employees, employers, and the 
government. In practice, employee and employer representatives were usually 
government appointees. 
                                                 
7 The details of KHM can be seen in Depnaker (1998). 
8 Since the aim is to provide a sufficient level of labour income to achieve a certain standard of living, the 
minimum wages in Indonesia are set in monthly, rather than hourly, terms.  
  7 Beginning in 2001, as part of the regional autonomy policy adopted and 
implemented throughout the country, the power to set minimum wage levels has been 
transferred to governors, mayors, and regents (bupati), as the respective heads of 
provinces, cities, and districts (kabupaten).
9 As of 2000, Indonesia has 341 cities and 
districts. In setting the levels of minimum wages, mayors and regents also receive 
recommendations from tri-partite councils in their regions.  
 
III.  Data 
The data analysed in this study are drawn mainly from the National Labour Force 
Surveys (Sakernas), collected annually by Statistics Indonesia (BPS). Sakernas is a 
nationally representative repeated cross-section survey that each year is conducted 
annually in the month of August covering all provinces in Indonesia. In particular, the 
analysis in this study uses the Sakernas data from the 1988 to 2000 surveys, except for 
the 1995 data which are from the labour force module of the Inter-census Population 
Survey (Supas). The numbers of households and individuals in the sample for each year 
are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
Sakernas and the labour force module of Supas collect information on individual 
main employment activities, earnings, and hours of work on the primary job, as well as 
data on individual characteristics such as gender, age, and level of education. To make 
nominal wages and minimum wages comparable across years, they are deflated by the 
annual provincial Consumer Price Index (CPI). In addition, the study also uses the 
regional gross domestic product (RGDP) data from each province, published by BPS. 
                                                 
9 See the Minister of Manpower and Resettlement Decree No. 226/2000. 
  8 The minimum wage data, meanwhile, were obtained from the Department of Manpower 
and Transmigration. 
 
IV.  Trends in Minimum Wages 
As a result of the changes in labour market policy in the late 1980s, minimum 
wages have become an important plank of government’s labour policy. This is evident 
from the speed at which the level of minimum wages had been increased by the 
government. Figure 1 shows the trend in the real minimum wage from 1989 to 2000 
compared to the trends in the average real wage and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
during the same period.
10  
The figure shows that in real terms minimum wages in Indonesia have increased 
much faster than both the average wage and GDP. The level of the real minimum wage in 
1994 is around 2.4 times its 1989 level, mainly the result of large increases in minimum 
wage in 1990 and 1994. Curiously, Figure 1 also indicates that those two large increases 
in minimum wage coincided with declines in average wage. When the real minimum 
wage was increased by almost 50 percent in 1990, the real average wage declined by 
more than 12 percent in the same year. Similarly, when the real minimum wage was 
increased by 30 percent in 1994, the real average wage declined by around 2 percent. 
During the other periods before the crisis, when the increases in real minimum wages 
were more modest, generally real average wage also increased, more or less in line with 
increases in real GDP. 
                                                 
10 The “national level” minimum wage represented in Figure 1 is calculated as the average of regional 
minimum wages weighted by the number of urban formal sector workers in each region.  
  9 The figure also shows that the real minimum wage in 2000 was increased 
substantially, much higher than the increases in real average wage and real GDP. The 
increase in weighted average of real regional minimum wages was more than 17 percent, 
while the increase in real average wage was around 13 percent and the real GDP grew by 
less than 5 percent. Although it cannot be shown in the figure yet, the real minimum 
wages were further increased by even much higher proportion in the following year. This 
would certainly have brought the 2001 level of minimum wage to a new peak, higher 
than the pre-crisis peak in 1997.  
As a result of the faster increases in minimum wages relative to average wages, 
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of minimum to average wage increased markedly from 
around 20 percent in 1989 to around 50 percent in 1994. This ratio has stayed at around 
that point since then with only a slight decline during the crisis. The figure also shows the 
proportion of workers whose monthly earnings were less than the minimum wages. In 
general, this proportion tended to increase up until 1994 and then steadily decreased since 
then. It increased from around 7 percent in 1989 to around 21 percent in 1994 and 1995, 
and then continuously declined to reach less than 11 percent by 2000. This implies that 
there has been a tendency for a higher compliance with the minimum wage regulations 
over time since the mid 1990s.  
 
V.  Minimum Wages and the Wage Distribution 
Some studies have shown that the impact of minimum wages are not limited to 
workers with wages around the minimum but also to the whole wage distribution (e.g. 
Maloney and Nuñez, 2001; Neumark et al., 2000). Figure 3, which is a kernel density of 
  10 the wage distribution in the Indonesian urban formal sector, shows the evolution of how 
minimum wages have affected the wage distribution in Indonesia over time. In this series 
of diagrams, the wage of each worker is measured as a ratio of the worker’s nominal 
wage to the nominal minimum wage applying in the region where the worker lives. 
Therefore, the vertical line at point 1 in each of the graph represents the minimum wage 
level.  
Figure 3 reveals that in 1988, a year before the minimum wage regulations were 
revamped, minimum wages had very little impact on the wage distribution in Indonesia. 
There was no apparent spike in the wage distribution around the minimum wages. But 
this has changed over time. By 1992, the impact of minimum wages on the wage 
distribution had become more apparent. Spikes at and around the minimum wage 
occurred in the distribution. In 1996, the mode of the wage distribution was only slightly 
higher than the minimum wage. By 1999, and also in 2000, the minimum wage has 
become the mode of the distribution, indicating that minimum wages have become 
binding for the majority of workers.  
The graphs in Figure 3 show the wage distribution for all workers. As mentioned 
earlier, minimum wage regulations may have a different impact on different groups of 
workers. Figure 4 shows the impact of minimum wages on the wage distributions across 
various groups of workers in 2000. Again the vertical line at point 1 in each of the graph 
represents the minimum wage level. As indicated before, only wage workers in the urban 
formal sector are included.  
Graph (a) reveals that the wage distributions of both male and female workers are 
affected by minimum wages, but it appears that the wage distribution of female workers 
  11 is more affected than that of male workers. The proportion of female workers at the 
minimum wages is higher than the proportion for male workers. In addition, while the 
mode of the wage distribution for female workers is at the minimum wages, the mode for 
male workers is still slightly higher than the minimum.  
In terms of age, Graph (b) indicates that the wage distributions of both adult and 
youth workers are affected by minimum wages. In this study, youth workers are defined 
as those between 15 and 24 years old. The graph reveals that the wages of most youth 
workers are at or around the minimum, only a few of youth workers earn more than 
double the minimum. The graph, however, still indicates that the impact of minimum 
wages on adult workers is also significant as the mode of the wage distribution is only 
slightly higher than the minimum.  
Education is also an important determinant of earnings. In Graph (c), workers are 
grouped into two categories, the “educated” and the “less educated”, where the less 
educated workers are defined as those with lower secondary education or below. As 
expected the graph reveals that the wage distribution of less educated workers is more 
affected by minimum wages than that of educated workers. However, the graph indicates 
that the impact of minimum wages in altering the shape of the wage distribution of 
educated workers is also still significant. 
When workers are separated into white-collar and blue-collar workers as shown in 
Graph (d), it becomes clear that minimum wages have very different consequences for 
their wage distributions. The graph suggests that the wage distribution of white-collar 
workers is not much affected by the presence of minimum wages as their earnings are 
mostly way above the minimum. On the other hand, the majority of blue-collar workers 
  12 are clearly affected by the minimum wages, indicated by the fact that the minimum is the 
mode of the wage distribution for these workers. 
Finally, Graph (e) shows the wage distribution for full-time and part-time 
workers. A worker is classified as a part-time worker if he or she works less than 30 
hours per week. The graph shows that minimum wages are only binding for full-time 
workers and the minimum is the mode of their wage distribution. For part-time workers, 
however, minimum wages are of no consequence, since most earned less than the 
minimum. This indicates that minimum wages are not binding for this group of workers. 
 
VI.  Wage and Employment Impacts of Minimum Wages 
The purpose behind minimum wage regulations is to attempt to lift the wages of 
those workers who currently earn below the minimum wage. All other things being equal, 
this will also increase the average of all workers’ wages. Unfortunately, in reality things 
are not that simple. The imposition of minimum wages by a government affects both 
supply and demand in the labour market. Hence, the impact of minimum wages is not 
only limited to wages, for there is also an impact on employment. Of equal importance, 




To formally formulate a simple model of how minimum wages may affect wages 
and employment, let us define supply and demand for workers as follows: 
X w m w l
S S S S S θ γ β α + + = ) ( +        ( 1 )  
  13 Y w m w l
D D D D D θ γ β α + + = ) ( +        ( 2 )  
where  S and D indexes supply and demand respectively, so that l
S represents labour 
supply,  l
D represents labour demand, w represents wages, m represents the minimum 
wage, X is a vector of labour supply shifters, Y is a vector of labour demand shifters, 
while α’s, β’s, γ’s, and θ’s are vectors of parameters. The minimum wage is defined as a 
function of wages due to the fact that the prevailing wage rates are one of the factors that 
is considered in the regulation on setting minimum wages. 
In equilibrium, labour supply is equal to labour demand. The reduced form 
solutions for wages and employment respectively are: 
X Y w m w
w w w w Σ + Π + Ω + Λ = ) (        ( 3 )  
X Y w m l
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Equations (3) and (4) show that both wages and employment are affected by the 
minimum wage, labour demand shifters, and labour supply shifters. Since the parameters 
of interests are Ω
w and Ω
l   that is how the minimum wage affects wages and 
employment  equations (3) and (4) can be directly estimated to obtain the estimates of 
these parameters.  
In estimating equation (3), however, the minimum wage variable is an endogenous 
variable as it is a function of wages, the dependent variable. Hence, to obtain a consistent 
estimate, it is necessary to estimate this wage equation using the instrumental variable 
  14 method. Meanwhile, in equation (4) the minimum wage variable can be treated as an 
exogenous variable. Hence, an estimation of this employment equation using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method will produce a consistent and efficient method. 
 
Provincial Panel Data Construction 
Following Rama (1996), data on individual wages and employment from the 
Sakernas are aggregated at the province level. These data on provincial average wages 
and employment level, which are calculated for the whole aggregate of all workers as 
well certain segments of workers in the urban formal sector, are then combined across 
years to form a set of panel data with the province as the unit of observation.  
This panel data set is then merged with other provincial-level data on the minimum 
wages, yearly consumer price index (CPI), regional gross domestic product (RGDP), and 
demographic variables. The complete panel data set can be constructed for all 26 
provinces in Indonesia, covering a yearly time period from 1988 to 1999, so in total there 
are 312 points of observation. The exceptions are for white-collar and blue-collar workers 
data, which are only available starting from 1994.  
 
The Results of Estimations 
The wage regression of equation (3) is estimated using the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) method on the provincial panel data for all workers as well various 
segments of workers.
11 In these estimations, the minimum wage variable is instrumented 
by its one period lag and other exogenous variables in the model. The labour supply 
                                                 
11 Table A2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of the Indonesian labour market.  
  15 shifter is the population group of 15 years and over, while the labour demand shifter is 
real regional gross domestic product. Province dummies are included to measure the 
fixed effects of provincial specific characteristics, which do not vary across time. 
Meanwhile, year dummies are included to measure specific time effects, which affect all 
provinces in any given year. 
In addition, a variable of degree of compliance to minimum wages is included in 
the estimations. As shown by Figures 2 and 3, compliance to minimum wages in 
Indonesia has increased over time. This has important consequences on how minimum 
wages affect labour market outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the impact 
of varying degree of compliance to measure the true impact of minimum wages.
12 
Consistent with Figure 2, in these estimations the degree of compliance is approximated 
by the proportion of workers who earn above the minimum wage.  
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 1. The table indicates that the 
elasticities of average wages with respect to the minimum wage in general are positive 
but statistically insignificant. This is true for all workers as well as all segments of the 
workforce, except for female and adult workers where the coefficients are negative. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient for blue-collar workers is statistically significant.  
                                                 
12 Rama (1996) asserts that minimum wages would have a limited impact on labour market outcomes if 
firms were not forced to comply. He argues that in the context of Indonesia in early 1990s, there were two 
main sources of non-compliance. Firstly, firms that that were unable to afford the minimum wage can 
request a waiver from the government. Secondly, and more importantly, there was a weakness in the 
enforcement capabilities of the government. In spite of this, both Rama (1996) and Islam and Nazara 
(2000) did not control for compliance in their regression estimations.  
  16 These results imply that the impact of minimum wages on pushing up average 
wages across the workforce is in general statistically no different from zero. This does 
not mean that minimum wages have no impact on the wages of individual workers. 
Rather, it suggests that the impact is mixed. The wages of some workers are pushed up by 
minimum wages, while the wages of others are depressed by minimum wages, resulting 
in no significant impact on average wages. The exception is for blue-collar workers, 
where minimum wages have a statistically significant positive impact on their average 
wages. The estimated elasticity of 0.89 implies that a 10 percent increase in real 
minimum wages will increase the real average wages of blue-collar workers by around 9 
percent. 
The coefficients of the degree of compliance variable are also positive although 
statistically not significant, except again for blue-collar workers. This means that higher 
compliance with the minimum wage regulations tends to add to the positive impact of 
minimum wages on average wages. In particular, blue-collar workers benefit significantly 
from higher compliance with minimum wages. 
Meanwhile, the employment regression of equation (4) is estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method on the same data set for the whole aggregate of all 
workers as well as various segments of the workforce. The set of independent variables 
used in these estimations is the same as in the wage regressions. The results of the 
estimations are presented in Table 2.  
The table shows that the coefficients of the minimum wage variable for all 
workers and all segments of the workforce are negative, except for white-collar workers. 
The coefficient for all workers indicates that the elasticity of total employment to the 
  17 minimum wage is –0.112 and statistically significant. This implies that every 10 percent 
increase in real minimum wages will result in more than one percent reduction in total 
employment. Similarly, the coefficients for female, youth, less educated, full-time, and 
part-time workers are also all negative and statistically significant. Their employment 
elasticities with respect to minimum wages are –0.307 for female and youth workers, -
0.196 for less educated workers, –0.086 for full-time workers, and –0.364 for part-time 
workers.  
Meanwhile, the only group of workers which benefit from the minimum wage in 
terms of employment are white-collar workers. Their employment elasticity to the 
minimum wage is 1.0 and statistically significant. This implies that a 10 percent increase 
in the real minimum wages will increase the employment of white-collar workers by also 
10 percent. This perhaps indicates the substitution effect of minimum wages on the 
employment of different types of workers. As the level of minimum wages is increased, 
firms reduce the employment of the other types of workers and replace them by 
employing more white-collar workers. This also provides an indication that firms change 
technologies in response to increases in minimum wages. Due to capital-skill 
complementarity, higher proportion of white-collar workers employed usually indicates 
that more capital-intensive technologies have been adopted.  
Like the impact on average wages, the coefficients of the degree of compliance 
variable indicate that higher compliance tends to strengthen the negative impact of 
minimum wages on employment. The signs of the coefficients of this variable in general 
are the same as the signs of the coefficients of the minimum wage variable. In particular, 
the coefficients for all, female, youth, less educated, and part-time workers are 
  18 statistically significant. However, higher compliance has no impact on the employment of 
white-collar workers.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The results of the analysis have shown that in general minimum wages have a 
positive but insignificant impact on average wages, and simultaneously a negative and 
significant impact on employment, except for white-collar workers where the 
employment impact is found to be positive. Higher compliance is found to strengthen 
these opposing impacts of minimum wages on average wages and employment. This sub-
section seeks to verify whether these findings are robust to different model specifications 
and estimation procedures. 
The inclusion of the degree of compliance in the regression is an innovation in 
this study. Hence, the first sensitivity analysis is to run the wage and employment 
regressions without this degree of compliance variable. The results for the wage 
regression are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix, while the results for the 
employment regression are shown in Table A4. The coefficients of the minimum wage 
variable in Table A3 still indicate that the impact of minimum wages on average wages is 
not statistically significant, except for blue-collar workers. Most of the coefficients still 
have a positive sign, but in addition to the coefficients for female and adult workers, the 
coefficient for educated workers is now also negative. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients in Table A3 in general are smaller compared to those in Table 1.  
For employment regression, all coefficients in Table A4 have the same signs as 
those in Table 2. However, the coefficients for youth, full-time, and part-time workers are 
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elasticities in Table A4 are in general smaller compared to those in Table 2. Hence, these 
results still indicate that the impact of minimum wages on employment mostly tend to be 
negative, except for white-collar workers. In fact, the coefficients for white-collar 
workers in the Tables 2 and A4 are almost exactly the same.  
Comparing the results of this first sensitivity analysis with Tables 1 and 2 gives an 
evidence that the degree of compliance variable has strengthened the estimated impact of 
minimum wages on average wages and employment. This is an expected result as higher 
compliance means increased effectiveness of the minimum wage regulations in affecting 
both the wage and employment decisions of firms and workers. However, it is necessary 
to test whether a different measure of the degree of compliance will produce a different 
impact. Hence, a second sensitivity analysis is to re-run the wage and employment 
regressions in Tables 1 and 2 using a different measure of the degree of compliance.  
Drawing from Figures 3 and 4, the skewness of the wage distribution is used as 
the alternative measure of the degree of compliance. The results are presented in Table 
A5 in the appendix for wage regressions and in Table A6 for employment regressions. 
The coefficients of the minimum wage variable in Table A5 in general have the same 
signs as those in Table 1, except that the coefficient for educated workers is now negative 
and the coefficient for blue-collar workers becomes insignificant. In addition, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients in Table A5 are generally smaller than those in Table 1. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients of the degree of compliance variables in Tables 1 and 
A5 cannot be directly compared as a different measure is used in each case. However, the 
  20 coefficients in the two tables all have the same signs and most of the coefficients in Table 
A5 are statistically significant.  
Similarly, the coefficients of both the minimum wage and the degree of 
compliance variables in Table A6 generally have the same signs as those in Table 2. Like 
the coefficients in the wage regressions, the magnitudes of the coefficients of the 
minimum wage variable in Table A6 are in general smaller compared to those in Table 2. 
On the other hand, all of the coefficients of the degree of compliance variable in Table 
A6 are insignificant. These results, and the comparison between the coefficients in Tables 
A5 and A6 with those in Tables A3 and A4, strengthen the conclusion that the higher the 
compliance with minimum wages, the greater will be the impact of minimum wages on 
increasing average wages and lowering employment. 
In examining the impact of minimum wages on employment, Rama (1996) uses 
various measures of minimum wages. In particular, he stresses the ratio of minimum 
wages to average wages as a measure of minimum wages relative to market wages. This 
alternative measure of minimum wages is examined in the third sensitivity analysis in 
this study. As this alternative measure of minimum wages has average wages as one of its 
components, the regressions are only run for the employment equation.  The results are 
presented in Table A7 in the appendix.  
The coefficients of the minimum wage and the degree of compliance variables 
resulting from the regressions using their alternative measure of minimum wages is in 
general still negative. In addition to female and part-time workers, the minimum wage 
coefficients for male and adult workers now are also significant. However, the 
  21 coefficients for all workers and for youth, less educated, white-collar, and full-time 
workers become statistically insignificant.  
 
VII.  Conclusions 
In 2000 and 2001, the Indonesian Government has vigorously pursued a minimum 
wage policy. The levels of regional minimum wages have been increased very 
significantly since the crisis. As a result, the real minimum wages in 2001 are estimated 
to be already higher than the peak pre-crisis levels in 1997. This was all done against the 
backdrop of an economy, which is still struggling to recover from a severe economic 
crisis. Given the low economic growth environment, there are growing concerns that 
further large increases in minimum wages may reduce long term economic growth and 
slow employment growth in the modern industrial sector. 
This study finds that as minimum wages continued to increase during most of the 
1990s, compliance has also steadily increased since the mid 1990s, with the result of 
altering the entire wage distribution of urban formal workers. In 1988, a year before 
minimum wage regulations were revamped, minimum wages had very little impact on the 
wage distribution. But this changed over time. By 1999 and 2000, the minimum wage 
had become the mode of the distribution, indicating that minimum wages had become 
binding for the majority of workers. 
The results of the analysis in this study show that increases in minimum wages 
push up wages of blue-collar workers. The results also show a positive link between 
minimum wages and average wages of most other groups of workers (female, youth, less 
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significant.  
More importantly, the results of the analysis show that increases in minimum 
wages have a negative impact on urban formal sector employment, except for white-
collar workers. For all workers, the estimated elasticity of total employment to minimum 
wage is –0.112 and statistically significant. This implies that for every 10 percent 
increase in real minimum wages, there will be more than a one percent reduction in total 
employment, controlling for other factors affecting employment, such as economic 
growth and growth in the working population. 
Significantly, the negative impact of minimum wage increases are greatest for 
those groups that are most vulnerable to changes in labour market conditions such as 
females, youth, and less educated workers, which make up the bulk of Indonesian labour 
force. For females and youths workers, the employment elasticities with respect to 
minimum wages are larger than –0.3, while for less educated workers is around –0.2.  
On the other hand, white-collar workers are the only category of workers to have 
benefited from minimum wages in terms of employment. Their employment elasticity to 
minimum wage is 1.0 and statistically significant, which perhaps indicates the 
substitution impact of minimum wages on the employment of different types of workers. 
As the level of minimum wages is increased, firms reduce the employment of the other 
types of workers and replace them with white-collar workers. This may be due to firms 
substituting more capital and skill-intensive production processes in place of labour-
intensive processes in response to increases in minimum wages.  
  23 These results imply that minimum wages benefit some workers and disadvantage 
others. Workers that keep their factory jobs clearly benefit from increases in minimum 
wages. White-collar workers are clear winners from a vigorous enforcement of minimum 
wage policy. However, those that lose their jobs as a result of increases in minimum 
wages are losers from minimum wage policy. The potential losers are those workers most 
vulnerable to changes in labour market conditions such as female, youth, and less 
educated workers.  
If increases in minimum wages reduces employment growth in the modern sector 
below the growth in the working population, more unskilled workers may be forced into 
inferior jobs in the informal sector. Thus, the impact of minimum wages on employment 
in the modern sector is only part of the story. Their impact is perhaps equally important, 
if not more, on the welfare of workers in the informal sector, which accounts for the bulk 
of the workforce in Indonesia. An important area for further research is to assess the 
spillover effects of the labour displacement impact of minimum wages in the formal 
sector on employment and real earnings in the informal sector.  
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Table 1.  Results of 2SLS Estimation of Wage Regression 
(Dependent variable: log of real wage) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 9.095  7.856* 





















0.514                      0.664 0.303 0.585 0.375 0.829 0.806 0.750 0.924 0.516 0.677
F-test 
 
6.59**                      12.42** 2.74** 8.92** 3.62** 30.50** 26.03** 10.54** 42.89** 6.63** 13.09**
Number of observations 
 
286                      286 286 286 286 286 286 156 156 286 286
Notes:  - 
a Measured as the proportion of workers who earn above the minimum wage 
            - Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            - ** is significant at 1 percent level 
            -   * is significant at 5 percent level 
             
             
             
 
 
  28 Table 2.  Results of OLS Estimation of Employment Regression 
(Dependent variable: log of employment) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.055  -0.471 





















0.998                      0.998 0.994 0.998 0.989 0.998 0.996 0.966 0.995 0.998 0.964
F-test 
 
2973.0**                      3198.8** 1038.1** 2894.3** 606.8** 2771.7** 1741.1** 102.4** 744.8** 2806.4** 179.5**
Number of observations 
 
312                      312 312 312 312 312 312 156 156 312 312
Notes:  - 
a Measured as the proportion of workers who earn above the minimum wage 
            - Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            - ** is significant at 1 percent level 
            -   * is significant at 5 percent level 
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Figure 1.  Trends in the Real Minimum Wage, Real Average Wage, and Real Gross 
Domestic Product in Indonesia, 1989-2000 
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Figure 2.  Ratio of Minimum Wage to Average Wage and Proportion of Workers 
Earning Less Than Minimum Wages, 1989-2000 
 
 
































































































Note:  The vertical line in each graph represents minimum wage. 
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(d) By Type of Job
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(e) By Full/Part Time
Ratio
 Full time  Part time










Figure 4.  The Impact of Minimum Wages on Wage Distribution 
across Various Categories of Workers, 2000 
 
 




  34 Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Number of Households and Individuals (15 year old and over) 
in the Sakernas Sample, 1988-2000 
 
Year Household  Individuals 
1988 64,032  190,582 
1989 42,858  183,302 
1990 80,704  240,090 
1991 78,391  234,178 
1992 77,088  233,489 
1993 79,458  231,689 
1994 71,561  205,006 
1995
a 211,248  605,056 
1996 72,925  208,371 
1997 64,752  185,720 
1998 48,478  139,266 
1999 47,580  135,295 
2000 31,432  86,488 
Note:  
aThe 1995 data is from Supas 
 
 
  35 Table A2.  Summary Statistics of the Indonesian Labour Market, 1988-1999 
                  Labour  Market  Characteristics 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996        1997 1998 1999
Size of labour force (in millions)  71.9  72.8  75.4  76.2  76.2  79.2  83.7  84.2  88.2  89.6  92.7  94.8 
Labour force participation rate 
(%)
a 
66.9                        66.1 66.4 66.0 67.8 67.8 66.8 65.4 66.9 66.3 66.9 67.2
Unemployment rate (%)
b                          2.8 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 4.4 7.0 4.9 4.7 5.5 6.4
Urban  labour  force  (%)  23.6                        23.9 25.5 27.7 28.7 29.5 31.3 34.3 33.9 35.6 36.0 38.1
Formal  work  force  (%)                          26.9 27.6 28.1 30.0 30.7 32.1 36.1 37.5 37.9 39.1 35.4 36.9
Female  labour  force  (%)                          40.1 39.9 38.8 38.3 39.0 38.6 38.9 36.5 38.5 38.3 38.8 38.4
Youth labour force (%)
c                          23.1 22.5 23.1 23.1 22.8 22.2 23.0 23.9 22.3 21.5 21.3 21.3
Less educated labour force
d                          87.9 87.0 86.5 85.4 84.4 83.7 82.0 85.9 78.8 77.9 77.4 76.3
Blue-collar  work  force  (%)                          - - - - - - 89.0 82.5 81.2 85.2 81.8 80.0
Part-time work force (%)
e                          28.9 28.2 28.0 27.6 29.6 29.1 28.4 32.4 33.3 26.5 28.6 27.3
Source:  Sakernas, except for 1995 where the data has been obtained from Supas. 
 
Notes:  -  
a The labour force participation rate is the proportion of the labour force from the total population 15 year old and over. 
-  
b Unemployment rates from 1994 onward are not comparable with the preceding period due to change in job search length. 
-  
c Youth labour force is defined as part of labour force whose ages are 15-24 year old. 
-  
d Less educated labour force is those who have at most junior secondary education level. 
-  
e Those who work less than 30 hours per week are considered to be working part-time.  
 
 
  36 Table A3.  Results of 2SLS Estimation of Wage Regression without Degree of Compliance Variable 
(Dependent variable: log of real wage) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10.793**  9.202** 





















0.501                      0.656 0.285 0.580 0.343 0.828 0.795 0.750 0.910 0.505 0.660
F-test 
 
6.51**                      12.43** 2.62** 9.00** 3.48** 31.27** 25.20** 10.95** 37.71** 6.63** 12.68**
Number of observations 
 
286                      286 286 286 286 286 286 156 156 286 286
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            ** is significant at 1 percent level 
              * is significant at 5 percent level 
             
             
             
 
  37 Table A4.  Results of OLS Estimation of Employment Regression without Degree of Compliance Variable 
(Dependent variable: log of employment) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.697  -0.749 





















0.998                      0.998 0.993 0.998 0.989 0.998 0.996 0.966 0.995 0.998 0.962
F-test 
 
3006.9**                      3284.0** 1012.1** 2968.8** 599.3** 2851.8** 1713.0** 106.4** 755.9** 2872.7** 178.6**
Number of observations 
 
312                      312 312 312 312 312 312 156 156 312 312
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            ** is significant at 1 percent level 
              * is significant at 5 percent level 
             
             
             
 
 
  38 Table A5.  Results of 2SLS Estimation of Wage Regression with Alternative Measure of Degree of Compliance Variable 
(Dependent variable: log of real wage) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.268**  9.477** 





















0.577                      0.698 0.356 0.653 0.358 0.846 0.818 0.750 0.913 0.584 0.661
F-test 
 
8.60**                      14.60** 3.52** 11.89** 3.63** 34.59** 28.38** 10.58** 37.54** 8.86** 12.37**
Number of observations 
 
286                      286 286 286 286 286 286 156 156 286 286
Notes:  - 
a Measured as the skewness of the wage distribution 
            - Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            - ** is significant at 1 percent level 
            -   * is significant at 5 percent level 
             
             
             
 
  39 Table A6.  Results of OLS Estimation of Employment Regression with Alternative Measure of Degree of Compliance Variable 
(Dependent variable: log of employment) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 






















































Log of population group 15 

















































Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.711  -0.760 





















0.998                      0.998 0.993 0.998 0.989 0.998 0.996 0.966 0.995 0.998 0.963
F-test 
 
2930.9**                      3203.1** 983.2** 2896.4** 582.1** 2771.8** 1677.5** 102.4** 730.3** 2808.4** 174.1**
Number of observations 
 
312                      312 312 312 312 312 312 156 156 312 312
Notes:  - 
a Measured as the skewness of the wage distribution 
            - Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            - ** is significant at 1 percent level 
            -   * is significant at 5 percent level 
             
             
             
 
 
  40 Table A7.  Results of OLS Estimation of Employment Regression Using Alternative Measure of Minimum Wage 
(Dependent variable: log of employment) 
      Independent Variable  All 
workers 
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Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies 
 
Yes                      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.294**  -0.978** 





















0.998                      0.998 0.993 0.998 0.989 0.998 0.996 0.965 0.995 0.998 0.965
F-test 
 
2884.8**                      3270.9** 977.2** 2919.1** 582.6** 2770.9** 1665.9** 98.9** 766.7** 2761.6** 186.0**
Number of observations 
 
312                      312 312 312 312 312 312 156 156 312 312
Notes:  - 
a Measured as the proportion of workers who earn above the minimum wage 
            - Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            - ** is significant at 1 percent level 
            -   * is significant at 5 percent level 
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